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MARY MCNALLY*
OLEN PAUL MATTHEWS**

Changing the Balance in Western
Water Law? Montana's Reservation
System*
ABSTRACT

Western water law is in transition. States have adopted a variety of
approaches to incorporatepublic, non-consumptive water uses with

existing uses. Montana's water reservation system seeks a balance
between existing and emerging water uses within the general
framework of the priorappropriationdoctrine. Water reservationsare
similar to, but fundamentally different from, prior appropriation
rights. The implementation of the water reservation system in the
Upper Missouri basin highlights the challenges and conflicts
inherent in trying to find, and manage, this new balance.

In the past two decades, the evolution in western water law has
well
recognized.' While some have called this a revolution, even
been
declared its death without mourning,2 virtually everyone recognizes the
continued validity of the prior appropriation doctrine, albeit in a
modified form. For those who own water rights, the appropriation system
is sacred and arguably should remain untouched. Against the sacredness

of existing rights, however, a new balance is being struck with public
non-consumptive rights playing an increasing role. Western states have
adopted a variety of strategies to incorporate these changes, including the

* Dr. McNalley is Associate Professor in the Department of Management and Economics
at Montana State University-Billings; Dr. Olen Paul Matthews is Chair of the Department
of Geography at the University of New Mexico.
The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of Larry Dolan from the Montana
Department of Natural Resources for help in understanding Montana's reservation system.
Any mistakes in interpretation, however, are ours. Also, thanks go to Clint Matthews whose
expertise as an electronic wizard taught us the joys of File Transfer Protocol (FTP).
1. See generally. Norman K. Johnson & Charles T. DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of
Western Water Law in Response to Changing Economic and Public Interest Demands, 29 NAT.
RESOuRcES J. 347 (1989); A. Dan Tarlock, The Changing Meaning of Water Conservation in the
West, 66 NEB. L. REV. 145 (1987); Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56
U. COLO. L. REV. 317 (1985); John M. Volkman & Kai N. Lee, Within the Hundredth Meridian:
Western States and Their River Basins in a Time of Transition,59 U. COLO. L. REV. 551 (1988).
2. Charles F. Wilkinson, In Memoriam: PriorAppropriation 1848-1991,21 ENVTL. L. v (1991).
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public trust doctrine,3 changing public interest criteria, 4 and preserving
in-stream flows.5 In spite of these changes, the basic principle of the
doctrine, first in time, first in right, has been maintained. Montana's
water reservation system6 illustrates the adjustments and problems that
occur when seeking this new balance.
In the West, states allow private property rights to be created in
water under the appropriation doctrine.7 The priorities created under the

prior appropriation doctrine give the earlier diversions the more secure
property right. Western states' constitutions frequently have provisions
stating that water belongs to the state or is held in trust for the people of
the state.8 The intent is not for the state to deny access to water users,
but to facilitate development by giving secure title to those who divert
water and apply it to a beneficial use. Most states manage the process

through a permit system.' Beneficial uses originally included those
important to economic development, with little consideration given to
other uses. Only in recent times have aesthetics, recreation, and environmental concerns gained public acceptance as beneficial uses. These newer
beneficial uses are an assertion of public rights, requiring a new
balancing of public-private rights and making it necessary to modify
existing state law.
Western states have modified existing water law in a variety of
ways. For example, many are redefining beneficial uses and modifying

3. See National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 712
(Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). See also Ralph W. Johnson, Public Trust Protection
for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233 (1980); Joseph L. Sax, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471
(1970); Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient PrerogativeBecomes the People's
Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195 (1980). But cf. Richard ). Lazarus, Changing
Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust
Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986).
4. Douglas L. Grant, Public Interest Review of Water Allocation and Transfer in the West:
Recognition of Public Values, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681 (1987); Ronald B. Robie, The Public Interest
in Water Rights Administration, 23 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 917 (1977). The meaning of
"public interest" is not the same for all states and has changed over time.
5. A. Dan Tarlock, Appropriationfor In-stream Flow Maintenance: A ProgressReport on "New"
Public Western Water Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 211; A. Dan Tarlock, Recent Developments in
the Recognition of In-stream Uses in Western Water Law, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 871; A. Dan
Tarlock, The Recognition of In-stream Flow Rights: "New" Public Western Water Rights, 25 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 24-1 (1979).
6. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316 (1993).
7. Frank J. Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public
Regulation, 5 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 7 (1965).
8. But cf. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982) (holding that water is an article
of commerce).
9. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1701 (West 1971).
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the requirements for a diversion."0 Contemporary definitions of beneficial use have expanded beyond traditional consumptive applications
designed to foster economic development by individuals to include
broader public concerns related to recreation, water quality, biodiversity,
and aesthetics." One important implication of this broadened definition
of beneficial use is the emergence of in-stream uses as a means of
realizing these public goals. Another implication is a modification of the
diversion requirement, which was traditionally the means by which a
valid right was established. To establish and protect in-stream flows,
many states exempt water from appropriation. Another common
mechanism states use is to authorize state agencies to appropriate water
to manage in-stream flows. 3 In addition, in the permit process, a few
states now consider in-stream and environmental values in approving
permits." In all cases, states have modified existing laws and practices
to accommodate changing public values. In some cases, these modifications have embodied innovative, even controversial, changes.' 5

10. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-151A (1994); CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (Supp. 1994);
IDAHO CODE § 42-1501 (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-707(b) (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. §
533.030 (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06.1(4) (1985); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 536.300
(1988); TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.023 (West 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.54.020(1)
(1992).
11. See, e.g., MODEL STATE WATER CODE § 2-3-05 (American Society of Civil Engineers) (3d

draft 1993) (includes the following beneficial uses: aesthetic, agricultural, commercial,
domestic, ecological, industrial, municipal, navigational, power generation, recreation, and
waste assimilation).
12. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.145a (1991); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 538.010 to 538.300
(1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-31 (1985); S.D. CODE ANN. § 46-5-38 (1987); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 73-6-1 (1989) (the Utah Governor, on approval of the state engineer, can suspend the
right to appropriate if the water is needed in the future for agriculture or other uses).
13. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-151A (1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3)
(1990); IDAHO CODE § 42-1503 (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-703a (1989); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 46-2107 (1988); OR. REV. STAT. ANN, § 536.325 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.22.010
(1992).
14. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311 (1993). See also Douglas L. Grant, Public Interest
Review of Water Rights Allocation and Transfer in the West: Recognition of Public Values, 19 ARiz.
ST. L. J. 681 (1987).
15. See generally IN-STREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST (Lawrence T. MacDonnell et
al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter IN-STREAM FLOW]. See also Richard Ausness, Water Rights, the
Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of In-stream Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 407; Brian E.
Gray, A Reconsiderationof In-streamAppropriative Water Rights in California, 16 EcOLOGY L.Q.
667 (1989); John S. Harbison, Waist Deep in the Big Muddy: PropertyRights, Public Values, and
In-stream Waters, 26 LAND & WATER L REV. 535 (1991); Joseph Q. Kaufman, An Analysis of
In-stream Water Rights in Oregon, 28 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 285 (1992); Lori Potter, The Public's
Role in the Acquisition and Enforcement of In-stream Flows, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 419
(1988); Charles C. Reynolds, Protecting Oregon's Free-Flowing Water, 19 ENVTL. L. 841 (1989);
Stephen J. Shupe, Legal Implications of In-stream Flows and Other Nonconsumptive Uses, in
WESTERN WATER LAW IN TRANSmON (1985).
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Montana's water reservation system is an interesting case in
point. This statutory system allows public entities to reserve water for
future consumptive needs and for in-stream uses.16 Also, the system is
significant because it is the only way to acquire in-stream rights for
specified beneficial uses, including water quality, recreation, and fish and
wildlife. 7 In addition, these flows can be reserved without the usual
prior appropriation requirement that the water be diverted or impounded. The reservation process also allows the water to be appropriated or
claimed now for a future use. Thus, the claimant has a current priority
date, even if the water is not actually developed until a later time. These
rights are established under a reservation process and clearly differ in
significant ways from water rights established under the prior appropriation doctrine. The balancing of these newly created reserved rights with
other rights will be an on-going challenge.
The challenge is more complex than accommodating the diverse
private and public interests of a single state. State decisions impact the
interests of other states, the federal government, and Indian tribes. 8 For
example, federal environmental laws, federal power over commerce, and
congressional control over federal property can lead to conflicts with
states. 9 Also, Indian water rights may have priority over rights created
under state law." Similarly, a state's water quantity laws cannot
unconstitutionally restrict interstate movement,2' and a downstream
state's water quality laws may impact an upstream state's water

16. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316 (1993).
17. Although it is possible to lease water for any beneficial use, including instream flows,
such leases do not constitute a permit or establish a water right. MONT. CODE ANN. §
85-2-141(9) (1993).
18. See generally D. Craig Bell & Norman K. Johnson, State Water Laws and Federal Water
Uses: The History of Conflict, and the Prospects for Accommodation, 21 ENVTL. L. 1 (1991);
Michael C. Blumm, Unconventional Waters: Quiet Revolution in Federaland Tribal Minimum
Flows, 19 EcOL L.Q. 445 (1992); Aaron H. Hostyk, Who Controls the Water? The Emerging
Balance Among Federal, State, and Indian Jurisdictional Claims and Its Impact on Energy
Development in the Upper Colorado and Upper Missouri River Basin, 18 TuLSA L.J. 1 (1982).
19. See generally Michael C. Blumm, Federalism, Hydroelectric Licensing and the Future of
Minimum Streamflows after California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission [110 S.Ct. 20241,
21 ENVTL. L. 113 (1991); Scott W. Reed, Fish Gotta Swim: EstablishingLegal Rights to In-stream
Flows Through the Endangered Species Act and the Public Trust Doctrine, 28 IDAHo L. REV. 645

(1992).
20. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564,577 (1908); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
600 (1963).
21. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 953; City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694, 707
(D.N.M. 1984). But cf. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 769 F.2d
568, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1985) (Congress can consent to restricting commerce allowing states to
limit the movement of water).
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management. 2 In the Montana example, the reservation system could
be impacted by these other sovereign interests.
The following sections will briefly describe Montana's water
reservation system, contrasting it with the conventional prior appropriation doctrine. The reservation doctrine is relatively new; its implementation in the Missouri River Basin will serve as a vehicle for examining its
potential strengths and weaknesses and the challenges of integrating
these rights within the prior appropriation framework. Any evaluation
would be incomplete without examining potential conflicts between other
sovereigns which share management of a watershed. The reservation
doctrine was intended to balance public/private and in-stream/off-stream
water uses; the degree to which it will be successful is open to question.
The PriorAppropriationDoctrine and Montana's Reservation System
Protection of Montana's water resources emerged as a major
political agenda in the 1970s.' Several factors precipitated this, most of
them tied to increased industrial demand, especially energy, and potential
agricultural developments.' Although concern focused on potential
conflicts between consumptive uses, in-stream flows were also getting
attention. In addition, potential conflicts between upstream and downstream states, particularly in the Missouri Basin, were becoming more
obvious. As one study subsequently noted:
A feeling prevalent in Montana is that water flowing out of
the state will be claimed by downstream states whose use...
It is also
is expanding more rapidly than Montana's ....
feared that, given the political power of lower basin states,
Montana could find it difficult to defend its claimed right to
future use of instate water in a national political arena.'
These pressures contributed to Montana's concerted effort to document
and protect existing water rights and uses, including in-stream flows.

22. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992). Because Indian tribes can also be
treated as states for purposes of the Clean Water Act, a tribe's water quality laws may
similarly impact an upstream state's water management. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1988).
23. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-601 (1993) (the Legislature passed a moratorium
suspending all new major permit applications in the Yellowstone Basin, pending a
systematic evaluation of existing and future requirements).
24. See J. Guhin, The Law of the Missouri, 30 S.D. L. REV. 346 (1985); H. Loble, Interstate
Water Compactsand MineralDevelopment (With Emphasis on the Yellowstone River Compact), 21
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 777 (1975).
25. Wright Engineers & Frank Trelease, Introduction to A Water Protection Strategy for
Montana (Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation, Sept. 1982).
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Within this context, the State legislature passed the 1973 Water
Use Act.' The Act was significant for a number of reasons. First, a
centralized system for administering and regulating water rights was
authorized.' Second, the Act recognized, for the first time, certain
in-stream flows as a beneficial use, including flows to maintain fish,
wildlife, and recreation.' Third, a process for reserving water for future
needs was established. Under this provision, public entities may apply to
the Board of Natural Resources and Conservation (BNRC) to reserve
waters for existing or future beneficial uses or to maintain a minimum
flow, level, or quality of water." These two developments, the recognition of in-stream flows as a beneficial use and the establishment of future
reservations, are key elements of the state's water reservation system.
A number of features distinguish reserved rights from traditional
prior appropriation water rights. Under the prior appropriation doctrine,
an applicant must show the proposed use is beneficial. In contrast, a
reservation can only be granted if "needed" or if constraints restrict an
applicant's ability to perfect a water permit." Need is established by
showing a reasonable likelihood that future in-state or out-of-state
competing water uses would consume, degrade, or otherwise affect
available water."
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, establishing valid rights
requires intentional diversions or withdrawals. Historically, the diversion
requirement helped stabilize property rights by giving potential users
notice that water was already appropriated. Water left in streams was
then considered unused and available. Water was implicitly viewed as
wasted until it was diverted and "put to use." In contrast, the reservation
process allows parties to establish a water right without actually diverting
or "developing" it.
While emphasis under traditional prior appropriation doctrine
was on consumptive uses of water, beneficial use now includes in-stream
as well as off-stream uses. In addition, for the purposes of establishing a

26. Montana Water Use Act of 1973, ch. 452, 1973 Mont. Laws 1121.
27. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-101 to -438 (1993).
28. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311 (1993) (Recognizing the importance of maintaining
minimum flows in critical trout streams, Montana authorized the Fish and Game
Commission to appropriate available water in portions of 12 streams in 1969. These Murphy
Rights were supplanted by more extensive provisions in the 1973 Act).
29. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316 (1993).
30. MONT. ADMIN. R. § 36.16.105A(c) (1988) (constraints include inability to finance a
project in the near-term, lack of increased demand for the water until some time in the
future, or the need for additional project planning before water can be applied to a
beneficial use).
31. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(4)(a)(ii) (1993); MoNT. ADMIN. R. § 36.16.105A(l) (1988).
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reservation, beneficial use is defined in terms of the public interest.32
The public interest is broadly conceived and encompasses such criteria
as whether the expected benefits are likely to exceed the costs; whether
there are reasonable alternatives to the proposed reservation; whether
failure to reserve the water is likely to result in an irretrievable loss of a
natural resource; and whether there are significant adverse impacts to
public health, welfare and safety.'
Closely related to the question of public interest is the issue of
who is eligible to apply for a reserved right. In contrast to prior
appropriation rights, which allow anyone who may beneficially use water
to apply, qualified applicants for reservations must be state or political
subdivisions or an agency of the state or federal government.' Thus,
public entities, not private parties, are the only qualified applicants.
In addition to these features, a number of other attributes of these
reserved rights differentiate them from prior appropriation rights. For
example, instead of priority being based on the date water is first put to
use, priority of reserved rights is generally based on the date a notice of
intent is filed with the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC).35 In the case of the Missouri Basin, the priority of
reserved rights were established by legislative action, and will have a
priority date of July 1, 1985.' Thus, the reservation process allows water
to be "appropriated" or claimed now for a future use, and the claimant
has a current priority date, even if the water is not needed or its use is
not developed until a later time.
Finally, prior appropriation rights are private property rights and
cannot be administratively modified without compensation. 37 In contrast,
reservations are conditioned and are subject to periodic administrative
review (at least every ten years) to ensure that the objectives of the
reservation are being met.' If the BNRC finds objectives are not met,
they can modify or revoke that right. Thus, all reserved rights may be

32. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(4)(a)(iv) (1993).
33. MONT. ADMIN. R. § 36.16.107B(4) (1988).
34. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(1) (1993).
35. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(9) (1993).
36. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-331(4) (1993). This will occur although the Board Order for
the Upper Basin was not issued until July, 1992, and the Lower Basin order is still pending.
37. See Trelease, supra note 7, at 35. However, courts question the security of these vested
rights through application of other doctrines. United States v. State Water Resources Control
Board, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986) (conditioning water rights); National Audubon Society, 658
P.2d at 712 (public trust doctrine); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (federal
reserved water rights). See generally Kevin M. O'Brien, New Conditionsfor Old Water Rights:
An Examination of the Sources and Limits of State Authority, 33 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 24-1

(1988).
38. MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 85-2-316(10) (1993).
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lost due to failure to meet intended objectives. In-stream reservations are
subject to additional scrutiny. Specifically, all or a portion of an in-stream
reservation may be reallocated to a different use if the following
conditions are met:
-the applicant for reallocation is a qualified reservant;
-the applicant shows current in-stream flow is not
required for its stated purpose; and
-the applicant shows the need for reallocation outweighs
the need shown by the original reservant. 39
Reallocation evaluations for in-stream uses may take place no more
frequently than every five years, and if water is reallocated, the original
priority date is retained.'
Montana's reservation statute thus allows public agencies to
establish prospective rights-that is, a current right for a potential future
use, both consumptive and non-consumptive. A mechanism for establishing in-stream flows is also provided. Both the prior appropriation
doctrine and reservations cannot adversely affect existing water rights.
But in many other respects, these approaches to establishing water rights
are distinctive and their successful integration into a single management
system will require a balancing act of considerable finesse.
EstablishingReservations in the Upper Missouri Basin
In 1985, the Montana Legislature directed the DNRC to initiate
reservation proceedings in the Missouri Basin." A major impetus for
this initiative was the 1982 Trelease report, which identified the Missouri
Basin as the drainage with the greatest potential for future conflicts,
particularly in light of competing demands for maintaining in-stream
flows (to accommodate navigation and hydropower) versus depletions of
water for consumptive purposes. 2 The study recommended using the
reservation process as a means of establishing Montana's claim to the
waters of the Missouri.

39. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(l1) (1993).
40. Id.
41. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-603 (1993). The reservation process was initially applied in
the Yellowstone Basin. See generally J. L. Thomas & Duane Klarich, Montana's Experience in
Reserving Yellowstone River Water for In-stream Beneficial Uses-The Reservation Decision, 17
WATER RESOURcES BULL. 255 (1981); Dr. Wilson F. Clark, A Free Flowing Yellowstone: The
Reservations Challenge, 10 MONT. OuTDooRs 29 (1979).
42. Wright Engineers & Trelease, supra note 25, at VII-6.
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The experience of establishing reservations on the Missouri
illustrates the complexities of developing and implementing this statute.
These complexities include both the process of establishing reservations
and the impacts of balancing these rights with others. The process for
establishing a water reservation can be summarized in five steps.
1) Eligible parties submit applications to reserve water
for existing or future off-stream and in-stream uses;
2) An applicant must demonstrate the purpose and
need for the reservation. The application requirements
are quite extensive and include an analysis of need;
determination of the amount of water necessary; documentation that public interest criteria are met; and
presentation of management plans for diversionary water
uses;4
3) Applications are reviewed by the DNRC, a process
which includes preparation of an EIS and a series of
public hearings and comment periods;
4) Other aspects of the reservation process conform to
general procedures outlined for acquiring a water permit
in that there is public notification of all water rights
holders and users who may be affected by, or interested
in, the reservation applications." Objections to the
application may be filed45 and, if objections are found
to be valid, contested case hearings are held where
applicants and objectors can testify and present evidence;46
5) At the conclusion of this process, the Board of
Natural Resources and Conservation can issue an order
reserving water (as requested or in a modified form) or
it may deny the application.47
In order to make the process manageable on the Missouri, the river was
divided into two major sections: the Upper Basin (upstream from the Fort

43. MONT. ADMiN. R. § 36.16.105, 106 (1988).
44. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-307 (1993).
45. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-308 (1993). A valid objector must have legal standing-that
is, their property, water rights, or interests would be adversely affected. MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 85-2-308(3) (1993).
46. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-309 (1993).
47. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-326(3) (1993). Board decisions may be appealed to the
district court, under provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. MONT. CODE ANN. §
2-4-702 (1993).
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Peck Dam to the headwaters) and Lower Basin. The reservation process
was applied to the Upper Basin first. Even with the split, the Upper
Missouri section encompasses a vast and diverse territory. It drains 42,000
square miles, including 436 miles of Class I (blue ribbon) and Class II
(high value) fisheries, and 150 miles of wild and scenic rivers. It flows
through a landscape that varies from its mountainous headwaters to the
semi-arid plains in central and eastern Montana.4
By the application deadline of July 1, 1989, DNRC had received
40 applications, totaling 559 individual reservation requests. These
included requests from 18 conservation districts, 18 municipalities, and
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, all of whom were requesting rights for
off-stream use.49 Applications for in-stream flows were submitted by the
Fish, Wildlife, and Parks (FWP), primarily for fisheries and wildlife
purposes, on 283 stream segments; Department of Health and Environmental Science (DHES), for water quality protection; and the U.S. Bureau
of Land Management, for fisheries and wildlife. The EIS sub-divided the
Upper Basin into four sub-basins ° and analysis of impacts and alternatives were addressed within the context of specific sub-basins.
The reservation process brought the issue of in-stream flows
versus consumptive uses of water to the forefront. Although Montana
generally has abundant water resources, this does not offset or preclude
local or regional scarcity. Agriculture is an important component of the
state's economy, and water for irrigation is a major use of water in the
state.5 ' Tourism is also an important component of the state's economy. 2 Tourists are attracted to Montana for many reasons, but the state's
scenic beauty and recreation opportunities are clearly key. Many of these
attractions are directly or indirectly linked to water.' The importance

48. Liter Spence, In-stream Flow on the Mighty Mo, 21 MONT. OUTDOORS 3-4 (July/Aug.
1990).

49. Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC), Draft
Environmental Impact Statement, Missouri River Basin (June 1991) [hereinafter Draft EIS].
See also DNRC, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Missouri River Basin (Jan. 1992)
[hereinafter Final EISI.
50. Draft EIS, supra note 49, at 11. The four sub-basins are the Headwaters (which
includes the Madison, Gallatin, and Jefferson Rivers), the Upper Missouri River, The
Marias/Teton Rivers, and the Middle Missouri River (down to Fort Peck Dam).
51. Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation, Montana Water Use in
1980 (Mar. 1986).
52. University of Montana Institute for Tourism and Recreation Research, The 1993
Outlook for Travel and Tourism in Montana (1993); University of Montana Institute for
Tourism and Recreation Research, 1990 Non-Resident Travel in Montana: An Economic
Report (1991). In 1990, non-resident travelers to Montana spent 760 million dollars that
resulted in 1,688 billion dollars of total economic impact. In 1992, it was estimated that
non-residents accounted for $900 million in direct spending.
53. Brian Morris, When Rivers Run Dry Under a Big Sky: Balancing Agricultural and
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of fishing and hunting is perhaps the most obvious example. Estimates
indicate that spending for hunting and fishing approaches $226 million
a year, with the potential to draw more than $521 million annually.'s
Adequate levels of in-stream flows are essential for fish and wildlife
preservation and for other water-based recreational activities. Many of
these uses are difficult to quantify, but they are increasingly recognized
as vital to the state's future well-being.55
In developing the EIS for the Upper Basin, differences between
sub-basins relative to the value of in-stream flows became apparent. One
study, commissioned by DNRC, surveyed people's perceptions about
water uses and estimated the value of these flows for recreation. It found:
-survey respondents were divided about the importance
of irrigation, as 46% agreed that irrigation was the most
important water use; 42% disagreed, and 11% had no
opinion;
- total recreational expenditures for all sub-basins were
between $57.9 and $81 million annually. These figures
varied significantly by region, with the Headwaters and
Upper Missouri sub-basins capturing the vast majority
($35 to $62 million) of those expenditures.
- this geographic disparity was also reflected in other
measures of recreation value.'
Overall, the study estimated that the total net economic value of
water-based recreation in the Upper Basin was significant, totaling $144
million per year.57 In addition, the research suggested that low flows

Recreational Claims to Scare Water Resources in Montana and the American West, 11 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 259, 260-62 (1992).

54. See, e.g., Matthew J.McKinney et al., The Protection of In-stream Flows in Montana: A
Legal-Institutional Perspective, in IN-STREAM FLOW, supra note 15, at 287. The Montana
Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks has conducted a series of studies on the economic
value of elk, deer, and antelope hunting and fishing.
55. See, e.g., Bonnie G.'Colby, The Economic Value of In-stream Flows-Can In-stream Values
Compete In the Market for Water Rights?, in IN-STREAM FLOW, supra note 15, at 87 (illustrates
non-market approaches being used to estimate the value of in-stream flows).
56. J. Duffield et al., In-stream Flows in the Missouri River Basin: A Recreation Survey
and Economic Study (1990) (prepared for DNRC as discussed in Draft EIS, supra note 49,
at 107). The survey of 8,000 basin and non-basin Montana residents and 1,000 non-Montanans used a contingent valuation method to estimate the value of water for recreationists-angler and non-angler alike.
57. Draft EIS, supra note 49, at S-5. Colby notes that, while substantial progress has been
made in assessing the value of in-stream flows for recreation, measurable recreation values
are only a small portion of the total value generated by these flows. Colby, supra note 55,
at 97.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 35

affected the number and quality of recreation trips, and thus had a direct
impact on an important and growing economic sector.' The value of
recreational uses, together with the importance of hydropower generation, meant that in-stream flows assumed greater significance in
evaluating reservation requests.
The prominence of reservation applications for in-stream use
made for a lively comment period. During July, 1991, DNRC had sent
notices about the Upper Basin reservation applications to about 11,000
water rights holders. Subsequently, more than 500 objections were
received.? Contested case hearings were held in February, 1992, along
with five public hearings.' After a proposed board order was prepared,
BNRC held another hearing to allow objectors and applicants to react to
the proposed order. From the general discussion of issues related to the
contested case hearings and from material contained in the Draft and
Final EIS, it appears there was considerable controversy over consump61
tive versus in-stream uses.
The draft EIS considered four alternatives relative to reservation
applications. These included:
1) no action-meaning no reservations were granted;
2) consumptive use-which emphasized the use of water for
irrigation (granting all reservation requests from conservation districts)
and municipal purposes, and gave municipal, irrigation, and in-stream
uses first, second, and third priority, respectively;
3) in-stream use-which gave priority to municipal and in-stream
uses and gave third priority to irrigation projects defined as at least
marginally feasible;
4) combination-which resembled option 2 in terms of priorities,
except irrigation projects were included only if they were at least
marginally economically and financially feasible. In addition, some
projects were excluded or reduced in size.
As a result of comments on the draft, the Final EIS included two
additional alternatives for Board consideration:
5) water quality-which included only reservations for in-stream
flows;

58. Draft EIS, supra note 49, at 110.
59. Montana DNRC Water Resources Division, Water Reservation Update 2-3 (Oct. 1992)
[hereinafter Water Reservation Update].
60. The procedures for contested case hearings are contained in MONT. CODE ANN. §§
2-4-601 to -623 (1993).
61. Final EIS, supra note 49, at 41-132.
62. Draft EIS, supra note 49, at S-2.
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6) municipal-which included reservations for municipal and all
in-stream uses, but no new irrigation projects. 3
The Final EIS found that the consumptive use alternative had the
greatest impact on the existing environment." Consumptive use,
particularly irrigation, had clear benefits, but was burdened by higher
costs. Municipal developments had benefits that substantially exceed
costs because of the small amount of water consumed and because of its
high value. Given the improved methods of valuing in-stream flows, and
the importance of hydropower, the in-stream alternative offered the
highest net benefit. In the final order establishing water reservations
above Fort Peck Dam, the Board gave first priority to municipal uses, but
gave second priority to in-stream uses throughout the entire Upper Basin.
Irrigation and other off-stream uses were assigned lower priority.'
Complications of Implementing Reservations
The reservation doctrine, as adopted in Montana, is a unique
approach to incorporating in-stream flows into future water planning and
management decisions. The economic value of this water has become
increasingly evident, as linkages between in-stream flows and recreation,
water quality, and protection of fish and wildlife habitat are refined and
included in development decisions. Experiences with the Missouri
indicate there is a lot of confusion about the process, procedures, and
intent behind reservations. As yet, there are many unanswered questions.
For example, reservations have proceeded in spite of the fact that the
state-wide adjudication process is still at least a decade from completion,
and the legal availability of water is often in question. The Upper
Missouri Basin section contains 28 of the State's 85 sub-basins; all are in
various stages of being adjudicated, but none of the 28 has a final decree
determining existing rights.' However, claims by existing users, if
verified, would account for much of the flow in the Missouri and its
tributaries.'7 Since reservations cannot adversely affect senior water
rights, it remains unclear how much water is, in fact, legally available.

63. Final EIS, supra note 49, at S-2 to S-3.
64. These impacts include everything from water quantity and quality, land use, and fish
and aquatic habitat to agriculture and social effects. They were assessed on a sub-basin level
as well as on an overall basis. Id.
65. Water Reservation Update, supra note 59, at 4.
66. Draft EIS, supra note 49, at 55.
67. Draft EIS, supra note 49, at 54-66. These users include irrigators, Montana Power
Company (with seven main-stream dams), Bureau of Reclamation (with six storage and
reclamation dams), Corps of Engineers, four Indian tribes, and assorted federal agencies.
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The reservation process provides a means whereby existing
in-stream flows can be maintained or protected. But there are critical
limitations. The most obvious issue is that in-stream appropriations can
be made only on available water: but there are many streams and basins
in Montana where water is fully "appropriated," particularly during
critical periods (June- August) when both in-stream and off-stream
consumptive pressures are likely to be most pronounced. As junior or
subordinate rights (to all existing, often consumptive uses), reservations
would also be least effective during periods of below average precipitation, when they would be most needed to protect fish and aquatic habitat,
water quality, or other resources. In other words, in-stream reservations
cannot address situations where the primary threat to in-stream values
is severe dewatering, either from senior consumptive uses or a drought,
or both.6 These limitations highlight a major shortfall of the reservation
system as a means of protecting in-stream flows: it simply maintains the
status quo. Other difficulties are found within the reservation system as
well. One notable issue is that in-stream flows are less secure reservations
than other types, as they are subject to modification, and even reallocation. Other reservations are transferable, but only if the entity holding the
right initiates the transfer. In contrast, in-stream flow reservations may be
reallocated if the Board finds that all or part of the reservation is not
required for its purpose and that the need for reallocations outweighs the
need of the original reservant.' Similarly, the ten-year review provision
for all reservations makes them less secure than other rights or permits
acquired under the prior appropriation doctrine.' While these provisions allow for flexibility (and may encourage more generous in-stream
flow awards), they also make these rights potentially more volatile. To
date, no party has formally petitioned for a reallocation of in-stream flow
reservations. 71
In contrast to the insecurity created by reevaluation, the
reservation system establishes preferences between reservations with

68. McKinney et al., supra note 54, at 292.
69. MONT. ADMIN. R. § 36.16.118(3) (1988) (applicants requesting changes in, or transfers
of, a granted reservation must also adequately meet the original decision criteria outlined
by BNRC).
70. Montana Board of Natural Resources and Conservation, In the Matter of the Ten-Year
Review of the Yellowstone Basin Water Reservations Notice of Conclusion of Review
Process (Dec. 1990). To date, only the reservations on the Yellowstone have been subject to
the 10-year review. That process was completed in December, 1990, with no petitions for
reallocation of in-stream flows.
71. See Sweet Grass County Conservation District, Narrative to the Montana Board'of
Natural Resources during its Ten-Year Review of the Yellowstone River Water Reservations
(Nov. 23, 1988) (the conservation district requested that BNRC consider reallocating some
in-stream reservations, but no formal motion to that effect has been filed).
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same priority dates. For example, all reservants in the Upper Missouri
were given the same priority date (July 1, 1985), but not all approved
reserved rights are equal. The order of preference was municipal,
in-stream (non-consumptive), and agriculture. This pattern of preferring
in-stream over consumptive uses was also evident in the Upper Yellowstone Basin, when the Board gave preference to in-stream rights over
irrigation.' These preferences were reversed in the Lower Yellowstone,
and similar outcomes may result in the Lower Missouri reservation
process, which is still pending.' Preferences have been used in other
states when simultaneous permit applications are made for a water
permit,7 4 but nothing of the magnitude of Montana's system has been
done and in-stream uses do not receive such high preference anywhere
else.
Aside from a number of procedural concerns, the emergence of
in-stream flows as a significant use for reservations has fueled an already
heated debate within the State.75 Most objections, as documented in the
Draft and Final EIS and Board Order, concerned in-stream flow reservations and their potential adverse affects, including granting in-stream
reservants standing in the adjudication process. It is notable that the
BNRC Final Order for the Upper Missouri Basin has been appealed to
District Court, and the majority of these appeals challenge in-stream
reservations granted to FWP.76 While the Final Order is being appealed,
the Legislature closed the Teton, Jefferson, and Madison River basins to
any additional permits to appropriate or reserve water.' The Legislature
also closed the Upper Missouri Basin to further applications until final

72. Clark, supra note 41, at 33.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06.1 (1975).
75. Cf. Thomas & Klarich, supra note 41; Clark, supra note 41; Schneider, Montana's
Yellowstone River (Montana Geographic Series No. 10); D. Sweetman, Protecting In-stream
Flows in Montana: Yellowstone River Reservation Case Study (1980) (In-stream Flow
Information Paper No. 10) (documenting some of the controversy over in-stream flows that
accompanied the Yellowstone reservation process).
76. In the Matter of Water Reservation Application Nos. 72155-41A and 72580-41A, Cause
No. DV-92-11466 (5th Dist. 1992); In the Matter of Water Reservation Application No.
72155-41A, Cause No. DV-92-11467 (5th Dist. 1992); In the Matter of Water Reservation
Application No. 72155-41A, Cause No. 8665 (5th Dist. 1992); In the Matter of Water
Reservation Application Nos. 69903-410 et al., Cause No. DV-9232 (9th Dist. 1992); In the
Matter of Water Reservation Application Nos. 72580-00-41A et al., Cause No. DV-92-11468
(5th Dist. 1992); In the Matter of Water Reservation Application No. 72155-41A, Cause No.
DV-92-11469 (5th Dist. 1992); Dep't of Health and Environmental Sciences v. BNRC, Cause
No. 92-1265 (1st Dist. 1992).
77. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-330 (1993). Such closures are authorized in highly
appropriated basths or sub-basins. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-319 (1993).
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decrees are issued for all the sub-basins. 8 Under stipulations in the
Final Order, these closures have the effect of suspending all reservations
except those granted to municipalities. While closing the basins to new
permits ensures that the status quo is maintained, it also highlights the
somewhat tenuous status of in-stream reservations and the questionable
legal standing of specific public entities (like FWP) in future adjudications.
Because the Board decision on the Missouri is recent (issued in
July, 1992), the full implications are only starting to emerge. 9 The Board
dearly sought flexibility and accommodation as much as possible. It is
also apparent that in-stream flows have assumed greater (basin-wide)
importance. This strategy makes sense, given that a major purpose of the
reservations on the Missouri is to assert and legitimize Montana's claim
to water. These in-stream purposes have assumed even greater importance, in light of the recent drought and the increasingly explicit conflict
between upper and lower basin states over the management of the
Missouri. It is notable that, although Draft and Final EIS were widely
circulated, virtually no comments were received from downstream states
or users, and the debate often focused on intra-state conflict over
in-stream versus consumptive (mainly irrigation) uses.'
Conflicts With Other Sovereigns
The relative quiet from downstream states may prove misleading,
however, as the implicit balancing of future and in-stream water uses
embodied in Montana's reservation statute does not fully account for
other sovereigns who may have an interest in Montana's water. Indian
tribes, other states, and the federal government cannot be ignored.8
These sovereigns share responsibility with Montana for the management
of a common resource. Sharing control over water leads to friction over
both water quantity and water quality. Indian reserved rights are one
area of potential water quantity conflict,' as are disputes between
statess and federal/state jurisdictional issues."

MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-343 (1993),
79. Missouri River Basin Final Order of the Board of Natural Resources and Conservation
Establishing Water Reservations above Fort Peck Dam Uuly 1, 1992).
80. Final EIS, supra note 49, at 41-132.

,78.

81. See generally A. Dan Tarlock, One River, Three Sovereigns: Indian and Interstate Water
Rights, 22 LAND & WATER L. REv. 631 (1987).
82. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 577; Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600.
83. See Sporhase, 458 US. at 953; City of El Paso, 597 F. Supp. at 707; Arkansas, 112 S. Ct.
at 1056.
84. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (Wild Free-Roaming Horses and
Burros Act was found to preempt state law); see generally 0. P. Matthews, The Supreme Court,
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Indian reserved water rights are different from the reserved rights
created under Montana law. Tribal reserved rights were established at the
time reservations were set aside, and they retain this priority date even
if the water has never been used or developed by the tribe.' Generally,
the right consists of enough water to irrigate all the practicably irrigable
acres on the reservation.' Several Indian tribes in Montana are negotiating with the State to quantify their rights, but in most cases, the quantity
of these rights remain an unknown.' The problem with unadjudicated
Indian rights is the same as discussed above with regard to unadjudicated state rights, as these rights will have a priority over rights established
under Montana's reservation statute. Future consumptive rights and
in-stream rights can never be secure as long as existing rights are
unknown.
A bit more complicated are the rights of other states especially
when the commerce clause is involved or states are asking for an
equitable apportionment. When water supplies are limited, states may
attempt to give preferences in use to their citizens or restrict the access
of non-citizens by banning exports. But the U.S. Constitution prohibits
states from using economic protectionism except under limited exceptions." The commerce clause is a guarantee of a free market, and setting
aside water for in-stream and future uses could be seen as interfering
with these free market principles.'
Montana has attempted to get around these problems by setting
up criteria to be used in out-of-state transactions.' If these are additionthe Commerce Clause, and Natural Resources, 12 ENVTL. MGMT. 413 (1988).
85. See generally Robert S. Pelcyger, The Winters Doctrine and the Greening of the
Reservations, 4 J. CONTEMP, L. 19 (1977); Harold A. Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How
It Grew: Federal Reservation of Rights to the Use of Water, 1975 BRIG. YOUNG U. L. REV. 639;
Richard B. Collins, The Future Course of the Winters Doctrine, 56 U. COLO. L REV. 481 (1985);
Stephen J. Shupe, Water in Indian Country: From Paper Rights to Managed Resource, 57 U.
COLO.L. REV. 561 (1986).
86. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 600-01.
87. See Mary McNally, The 1985 Fort Peck-Montana Compact: A Case Study, in INDIAN
WATER IN THE NEW WESr (T. McGuire et al. eds., 1993). The Fort Peck Tribes and Northern
Cheyenne are the only two tribes to date to successfully complete negotiations with
Montana.
88. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 953; City of El Paso, 597 F. Supp. at 707 (recognizing some
restrictions on the movement of water). The Supreme Court in a hazardous waste case
suggested "caps" could be used to restrict movement as long as in-state and out-of-state
users were treated equally. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992).
89. See generally Douglas L. Grant, The Future of Interstate Allocation of Water, 29 ROCKY
MTN.MN. L. INST. 977 (1983); Richard S. Harnsberger et al., Interstate Transfers of Water:
State Options After Sporhase, 70 NEB. L. REV. 754 (1991); Frank Trelease, State Water and State
Lines: Commerce in Water Resources, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 347 (1985); Richard A. Sims &
Jennifer Davis, Water Transfers Across State Systems, 31 ROCKY MTN. MN. L. INST. 22-1 (1985).
90. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(4)b (1993). The statute seems to limit reservations to
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al criteria, different from those used within the state, then they are
problematic. Under commerce clause analysis, statutes that are discriminatory in their language (facially discriminatory) are almost always
invalid.9' Even if no facial discrimination is found, statutes with a
discriminatory effect must pass a balancing test.' Discrimination as used
here means in-state and out-of-state interests are treated differently with
in-state interests benefiting and out-of-state interests being burdened. One
questionable area in terms of the Montana reservation statute language
is the "clear and convincing" standard of proof required for out-of state
applicants." This test is more stringent than is required for an in-state
user, and thus may constitute facial discrimination under a commerce
clause analysis.
A more substantive problem may be the statute's restriction on
approving only those waters which could not be transported to an area
of shortage within the state." This is a clear preference for in-state uses.
For example, if a city outside Montana wanted to import water, Montana
might deny application if the Board determined the water could be used
in an area where a shortage exists. Possibly, the permit denial could be
made even if the water was unappropriated and no one else had applied
for a permit. Such an outcome is arguably discriminatory. If this statute
is considered facially discriminatory, it is unconstitutional unless a
legitimate local purpose is advanced that cannot be served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives."
Conservation is an example of a
nondiscriminatory alternative which would certainly be more appropriate
than restricting exports.
Using the balancing test, this statute is also arguably unconstitutional regardless of whether these provisions are considered facially
discriminatory or not. Setting aside water for future economic uses has
a discriminatory impact on those outside the state who can show a
current demand. In such instances, the Supreme Court balances whether
"[t]he state or any political subdivision or agency thereof or the United States or any agency
thereof." MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(1). This would exclude "other" states and their
political subdivisions and agencies, a provision that would be clearly unconstitutional.
Because other statutory language contemplates exports, this provision has not been
interpreted to exclude other states from making reservations.
91. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,624 (1978); see generally Matthews, supra note
84, at 417; but c.f. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986).
92. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v.
Department of Environmental Quality of the State of Oregon, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 1350 (1994)
(reaffirming the two-part test).
93. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(4)(a) (1993). The standard of proof for in-state uses is
a "preponderance" of the evidence. Id. § 85-2-316(b).
94. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(4)(c)(ii) (1993).
95. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,278 (1988); see also Chemical Waste
Management, Inc., 504 U.S. at 339.
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the burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
local benefits.' The local benefit in this instance is a future one and
could be considered speculative; the applicant can show a current need.
Thus, under the balancing test for statutes that have a discriminatory
impact, the statute appears to be unconstitutional as well. Although
protecting water for future demands makes perfect sense to someone in
Montana, this kind of economic protectionism is prohibited by the
Constitution.' The only way Montana can avoid the problem is by
treating in-state interests in the same way as out-of-state interests."
When the reservations are reviewed periodically as required by Montana
law, out-of-state interests cannot be ignored. If the purpose of Montana
reservations is to protect in-state economic interests, the utility of the
system may be very limited when challenged by those from other states.
The in-stream uses could fare better under commerce clause
analysis. The exception to facially discriminatory statutes requires
determining whether a significant local benefit exists which cannot be
satisfied by nondiscriminatory alternatives." In-stream uses designed to
protect the environment would qualify because benefits are locally
significant and alternatives do not exist. But because this right is
vulnerable to requests for reallocation, out-of-state interests can also make
requests which add additional pressure on the ability to preserve
in-stream uses."° Showing the economic value of in-stream uses for
recreation and tourism may be critical in balancing beneficial uses
required by the periodic reevaluations, but the economic argument which
makes the balancing possible also makes it vulnerable to commerce clause
scrutiny.
Economic protectionism is not the only kind of dispute that arises
between states when a shortage of water exists. Down-stream states
frequently feel they are not getting their fair share. When this occurs, the
Supreme Court may be asked to equitably apportion a river or
stream."0 In equitable apportionment cases, the Court will look at many

96. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
97. See U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, c. 3.
98. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 504 U.S. at 339.
99. Maine, 477 U.S. at 151.
100. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(11) (1993).
101. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (the first equitable apportionment case);
see generally Harrison C. Dunning, State Equitable Apportionment of Western Water Resources,
66 NEB. L. REV. 76 (1987); Richard A. Simms et al., Interstate Compacts and Equitable
Apportionment, 34 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 23-1 (1988); Richard A. Simms, Equitable
Apportionment Prioritiesand New Uses, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 549 (1989); George W. Sherk,
Equitable Apportionment After Vermejo: The Demise of a Doctrine, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 565
(1989); A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and Restated,
56 U. COLO. L. REV. 381 (1985).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 35

factors which may harm or benefit the states involved."° The need to
set water aside for future and in-stream uses may be considered in this
balancing process. 1°3 Because Montana is upstream from most of the
states which share its watersheds, the downstream states will benefit
from keeping the water in-stream and, from a practical point, should
never complain about this happening. But, if water is to be taken out of
a stream at some time in the future, then the downstream state could
argue the reservation was designed to prevent them from current
economic development. This could be considered inequitable by the
Court and would certainly be a restriction on interstate commerce.ic
Having to consider interests outside the state in balancing uses during
reevaluation and dealing with the uncertainty created by equitable
apportionment decisions makes the reservation system less than an ideal
tool for dealing with conflicts between states.
The potential conflicts are not just limited to other states, as a
federal dimension is omnipresent. Most western states have felt that the
allocation of water was their exclusive prerogative and often point to the
thirty-seven federal statutes deferring to state water allocation law.'05
6
This position has never been as firm as states would like to believe,'0
with federal control over navigation0 7 and power generation' °8 influencing the amount of water that can actually be withdrawn under state
law. More recently, federal environmental laws'09 and water rights
associated with federal property have begun to influence the quantity of
water available for appropriation. Under the property clause, Congress
has power to make all rules necessary for the proper management of
federal lands."' Associated with this land base is enough water to carry
out the purposes Congress intended when the federal land was re-

102. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
103. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 184 (1982).
104. But cf. Intake Water Co., 769 F.2d at 568 (Congress can authorize encumbrances on
interstate commerce by approving compacts).
105. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 958.
106. See generally James L. Fly, The Role of the Federal Government in the Conservation and
Utilization of Water Resources, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 274 (1938); Dale D. Goble, PriorAppropriation
and the Property Clause: A Dialog of Accommodation, 71 OR. L REV. 381 (1992); Lawrence J.
MacDonnell, Federal Interests in Western Water Resources: Conflicts and Accommodation, 29 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 389 (1989); Frank J.Trelease, Federal Limitations on State Water Law, 10 BUFF. L.
REV. 399 (1961).
107. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557,563 (1870); United States v. Rio Grande Dam
& Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
108. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 424 (1940).
109. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1988).
110. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3. This power over federal property is virtually without
limitations. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543.
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served."' This federal interest is similar to the Indian reserved water
right and in many instances has not been quantified either. Because
congressional power over federal property cannot be limited by the
states, new water rights can be asserted at any time."' If this federal
right interferes with an unexercised future right under Montana law, the
federal right will probably prevail." 3 Montana reserved rights are
"contingent" because they are periodically reevaluated, which blunts
4
constitutional arguments over taking property without compensation
and could allow additional federal rights to be asserted. Federal interests
are not limited to these water quantity issues and have expanded to
include water quality.
Because water is an article of commerce, the federal government
can regulate water if it chooses to do so. Federal regulation of water
quality under the Clean Water Act is an example."' Other federal
environmental regulations such as the Endangered Species Act" 6 also
have an indirect impact on water quality. These federal laws preempt
contradictory state laws under the supremacy clause."7 The Clean
Water Act creates a partnership between the states, Indian tribes, and the
federal government for the management of water quality."8 Federal
minimum standards are set, but states can administer their own programs
if they have approval from the EPA." 9 Of interest here are the water
quality standards that states and tribes may set. Before a state or the EPA,
if they administer the program, may issue a discharge permit, they have
to consider the approved water quality standards of downstream sovereigns." If additional volumes of water are kept in streams and rivers
as a result of Montana's reservation system, then these water quality
standards will be easier to meet. But, future withdrawals may reduce
volumes, thus concentrating pollutants enough to violate downstream
water quality standards. Indian tribes have just recently begun to
111. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978) (the purpose of the
reservations on national forest lands was limited to water associated with timber harvest
and watershed protection).
112. See, e.g., Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1988); see also Sierra Club v. Block, 622
F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987) (federal
water rights are impliedly reserved in wilderness areas); Sierra Club v. Yeuter, 911 F.2d.
1405 (10th Cir. 1990) (Forest Service has discretion on whether to assert the right or not).
113. Kleppe, 426 U.S. 529 (under the Supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution article VI,
cl. 2, state laws that conflict with enumerated federal powers can be preempted).
114. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
115. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1988).
116. 16 U.S.C. § 1531-44 (1988).
117. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
118. See 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1988).
119. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1988).
120. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1056.
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establish water quality standards and the results of this process are too
recent to evaluate. 121 Congressional authorization is clear, as is the
federal power to delegate power to regulate water quality.1" Montana
reservations will be subject to future federal regulations which may have
a significant impact on these rights.
Concluding Remarks
Developing a balance-between established water uses and
*emerging demands, between in-stream and off stream uses, between
existing rights and future needs-is a daunting task. Montana's reservation system is an example of an innovative process that seemingly fits
within existing prior appropriation principles and yet modifies these to
accommodate changing demands and requirements. Such accommodation
is at the heart of the on-going evolution in western water law, but it is
also an uneasy alliance and an uncertain process. Reservations are based
in, yet differ significantly from, prior appropriation rights. They adhere
to the first in time, first in right principle, but fundamentally change
traditional understandings about what constitutes first in time. They
build upon the foundation of existing rights, but challenge conventional
ideas about how rights are established, and how and when water must
be "used." These rights have become an important vehicle for incorporating new beneficial uses-notably in-stream flows-into Montana's water
management system. But it is unclear how secure these reserved rights
are, or how durable they will prove to be.
Some of the issues concerning reserved rights raised in this paper
may be addressed or resolved relatively easily, as the process continues
to be implemented and public awareness increases. For example, as the
state-wide adjudication proceeds and water rights are clarified, concerns
about water availability may be eased, at least in some basins. Furthermore, the value of in-stream flows-for preserving water quality as well
as providing recreation and other economic benefits-will likely become
more evident in the near future. While this may add fuel to the debate
over in-stream versus off-stream uses, it may also become more apparent

121. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1988); see generally M. Chandler, A Link Between Water Quality and
Water Rights, in WATER WARS: THE RETURN OF THE RIPARIAN (1994). In the only case
contesting tribal power to establish water quality standards, the tribe won. See City of
Albuquerque v. Browner, Civ. 93-82 M, slip op. (D.N.M. Oct. 21.1993). This decision was
appealed, but a settlement was reached. A motion to vacate the judgement has been made.
Kevin Gover & Jana L. Walker, Water Quality Regulation on Indian Reservation, 40 ROcKY
MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 24-1 (1994).

122. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1056.
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that in-stream uses do not necessarily preclude consumptive uses, and
that both are essential when planning for the future.
Other issues are likely to be more persistent concerns. For
example, the provisions which permit review and reallocation of
reserved rights allow flexibility but also reduce certainty and permit
on-going challenges from other users. More generally, the potential
conflicts with other sovereigns-notably the federal government, Indian
tribes, and downstream states-remain significant. Some of these
problems could be solved if a compact is negotiated, binding all the
parties." Compacts do exist between tribes and states and have been
approved by Congress." Compacts have also been made between
states and the federal government.' 25 Compacts between the states in
the Missouri basin have been proposed in the past but have never gone
very far. 126 If additional sovereigns are added, such as tribes and the
federal government, the negotiation process would take on the patina of
an international treaty negotiation. The enormous political issues
associated with the Missouri River basin make such an undertaking a
remote possibility. Like compacts, federal legislation is also a theoretical
possibility, but, for many of the same reasons, a highly unlikely one as
well.
A more probable outcome is that Montana's reservation system
will continue to be implemented, and it will continue to be challenged.
Many of those future challenges could come from a variety of parties
who have yet to enter the fray. As a result, the reservation idea will
continue to evolve, along with the broader principles of the prior
appropriation doctrine.

123. See generally Zachary McCormick, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts in the Western
United States--Some Suggestions, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 385 (1994); George Sherk,
Resolving Interstate Water Conflicts in the Eastern United States: The Re-emergence of the
Federal-InterstateCompact, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 397 (1994).
124. MONT. CODE ANN; § 85-20-201 (1993) (The Fort Peck-Montana Compact) and MONT.
CODE ANN. § 85-20-301 (1993) (Northern Cheyenne-Montana Compact) are the two Montana
examples. See generally Mary McNally, Water Marketing: The Case of Indian Reserved Rights,
30 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 963 (1994).

125. See, e.g., Delaware River Basin Compact, 75 Stat. 689 (1961); Susquehanna River Basin
Compact, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970).
126. Guhin, supra note 24, at 476; see also Frank J. Trelease, A Federal-State Compact for
Missouri River Basin Development, 7 WYO. L. REV. 161, 189 (1953) (for an optimistic view of
compact possibilities).

